On March 11, 2022, many observers held their breath: the Russian government had instructed Russian website operators to become independent of the world web by that date. While it soon became clear that only state-owned websites and services were separating, the idea of Russia’s decoupling from the global internet has persisted in discussions and reports.
Within weeks of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia had effectively dropped a thick digital iron curtain between its more than 140 million citizens and the rest of the world. The Russian government has blocked numerous news sites and banned many popular Western internet services and social platforms, including Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. New laws against fake news threaten administrative and criminal charges against those Russians who report on their country’s war in Ukraine.
Despite this crackdown, Russia has not severed ties with the global internet. However, the idea of an autonomous RuNet is more than just a rhetorical device. Russia’s 2019 “Internet sovereignty” law created the legal basis for an on/off switch of sorts. It requires Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to enable routing of traffic through exchange points approved by the federal agency Roskomnadzor. It also allows Roskomnadzor to force ISPs to route traffic through special override systems that authorities can use to filter and redirect traffic. In addition, from 2021, Russian ISPs must be able to process queries to the Domain Name System (DNS), the Internet telephone directory, on servers located within the country, ensuring that computers can locate Internet resources even in case of nationwide disconnection from global networks.
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How these systems will work in real-life situations remains difficult to assess. An autonomous segment that replicates much of the functionality of the global Internet is more difficult to implement technically than to imagine politically. In any case, while Russia’s ability to disrupt cross-border data transmissions is implausible, it is hardly conceivable that this would not cause significant service degradation. Such a drastic step, therefore, seems unlikely unless the Kremlin deems it necessary to regain control of information or thwart cyber incidents.
Yet the war in Ukraine could further catalyze a more fundamental fragmentation of global digital connectivity. One dimension is the politicization of the technical governance of the Internet and, with that, the long-term risk of fragmenting the logical layer of the Internet, which ensures that data can flow between the many networks that together make up the Internet as a seemingly single entity. Russia and China, among others, have long advocated a stronger role for states in the technical governance of the Internet. But pressures for a greater political footprint of related institutions have also come from other parts. In reaction to Russia’s aggression, Ukraine has retaliated by attempting to sever Russia’s ties to the global internet and even limit its ability to resolve queries within the country. To this end, Ukraine has sent a letter to ICANN, the organization that coordinates the DNS, asking it to revoke the top-level domains issued in the Russian Federation (for example, .ru, . and .su) and close the root DNS servers located in Russia. Ukraine has also asked RIPE NCC, the regional Internet registry for Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia, to revoke Russian IP addresses.
Both ICANN and RIPE NCC rejected Ukraine’s request and stressed the importance of their neutrality in the technical governance of the Internet in order to preserve a global and interoperable Internet. Ukraine’s request would have created a precedent for an intertwining of foreign policy and technical administration, undermining the role of these institutions as universally legitimate governing bodies. If the global consensus on the technical governance of the Internet were to erode, the emergence of competing institutions and with them, divergence at the logical level becomes a serious risk.
Even as governance institutions have resisted political demands, growing struggles over control of digital infrastructures could deepen the fragmentation of the internet. The war in Ukraine has increased interest in high-bandwidth, low-latency Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, and questions remain about their interoperability and role in the global Internet. This has spurred countries’ efforts to develop and test their own satellite constellations. Even the (submarine) cables that carry more than 95 percent of global Internet data traffic are increasingly influenced by political and security considerations. In 2019, Australia completed a new submarine cable with the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea that was originally to be built by Chinese company Huawei Marine Networks. In 2020, an eight thousand mile undersea cable backed by Google and Facebook was rerouted to bypass Chinese territory following pushback by the US government. Just last month, Chinese telecom groups pulled out of the Sea-Me-We 6 cable project linking Asia and Europe amid rising tensions with the United States.
A year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the country’s decoupling from the global internet has not materialized. The war underscores, however, the temptation for states to weaponize the governance and technical infrastructure of the Internet. While some of the more blatant attempts to do so have been avoided, the broader geopolitical confrontation around the war is amplifying a deep fragmentation of global digital connectivity. Strategic considerations increasingly trump technical logic, and protecting the governance institutions and technical infrastructures that underpin the global internet from political maneuvering is becoming increasingly difficult.
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It is time for states to redouble their efforts to preserve the Internet as a global public good. With work towards a Global Digital Compact, facilitated by the UN Secretary-General’s Technology Envoy and to be agreed in September 2024, a global and inclusive process is underway to develop shared principles for the digital space. This is a key opportunity to forge universal recognition of the global internet as a key tool for addressing common challenges, including those set forth in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Efforts should also involve focused dialogue, for example within the Group of 20, on key piecemeal factors such as concerns about espionage and sabotage of internet infrastructure. Stopping the tide of Internet fragmentation may seem like a daunting task, but the stakes are high.
Professor Christoph Meinel is managing director and scientific director of the Hasso Plattner Institute for Digital Engineering (HPI) at the University of Potsdam. He is full professor of computer science at the University of Potsdam and holds the chair for “Internet technology and systems” at HPI.
Dr. David Hageblling is Senior Scientist at the Hasso Plattner Institute for Digital Engineering (HPI) of the University of Potsdam and Associate Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology.
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